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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ne Y ada, Inc. ("Ne Y ada") Appeals the district court's entry of summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, Marian G. Hoke and The Hoke Family Trust ("Hoke"). The
suit was brought by Hoke to set aside a Lease Agreement and Option to Purchase Hoke had
entered into with Ne Yada pertaining to real property located in Canyon County, Idaho. Hoke
alleged violation of the statute of frauds, proper party in interest, quiet title, undue influence and
fraudulent misrepresentation.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Complaint in this matter was filed by Hoke in Canyon County, Idaho on January 12,
2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 7. An Answer and Counterclaim was filed by NeYada on February 25, 2015.
R. Vol. 1, p. 37. A Response to Counterclaim was filed by Hoke on March 19, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p.

160.
On February 27, 2015, NeYada filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking, among
other matters, for a determination that the property description contained in the Lease Agreement
and Option to Purchase complied with the statute of frauds. R. Vol. 1, p. 81. On March 19, 2015,
Hoke filed her own Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 99. Her motion sought a
determination that the documents violated the statute of frauds and the proper party in interest. At
the time set for hearing on NeYada's Motion, March 26, 2015, the court discussed the Motions
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before the court with Counsel in chambers. The Court, with agreement of counsel, gave the
parties an additional eight (8) days, until April 3, 2015, to file simultaneous additional briefing
on the legal issues of the statue of frauds and apparent authority. R. Vol. 1, p. 208, Tr. Vol. 1, p.
5, L. 19-25, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 6, L. 1-7.
On April 9, 2015, the court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Counter Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol.
1, p. 207. The Court granted Hoke's Motion for Summary Judgment. It found that the documents
were unenforceable under the statute of frauds and that part performance did not remove the
agreements under the statute of frauds. R. Vol. 1, p. 214. Judgment in favor of Hoke was entered
on April 9, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 218.
NeYada filed a Motion to Reconsider Order and to Set Aside Judgment on April 13,
2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 220. The Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion to
Reconsider Order and to Set Aside Judgment was entered on May 6, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 263. The
Court denied the Motion to Reconsider finding that the Lease and Option were a single
transaction and therefore unenforceable under the statute of frauds. R. Vol. 1, p. 266.
Ne Yada appealed the Judgment and Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to
Reconsider on June 16, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 276. The Court granted Hoke's request for costs and
attorney fees in its Memorandum Decision and Order for Costs and Attorney Fees and for
Turnover of Property on July 22, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 292. NeYada filed an Amended Notice of
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Appeal on August 6, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 302.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For an appeal reconsidering a summary judgment motion, the appellate court will review
whether the district court acted within the legal standards applicable fo summary judgment.
Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000). Under Rule 56( c) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil procedure, summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issues as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." If the
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted.
Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-719, 918 P.2d 583, 587-588 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Hoke is an elderly widow living in Canyon County, Idaho. R. Vol. 1, p. 111. She is the
sole trustee of the Hoke Family Trust. R. Vol. 1, p. 111. The Hoke Family Trust is the owner of
certain real property ("Subject Property") located at 16867 Portner Road, Nampa, Idaho. R. Vol.
1, p. 111- 112. The Subject Property is commonly known as the "Hoke Mobile Home Park". R.
Vol. 1, p. 8, 111. It consists of fourteen (13) mobile homes situated on approximately 1.96 acres.
R. Vol. 1, p 15. The Subject Property is more specifically described as:
A part of Lot 9 of PORTNER SUBDIVISION, being a part of the East Half of the Northwest
Quarter, Section 7, Township 3 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho,
described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Southeast comer of Lot 9 of said PORTNER SUBDIVISION, Canyon
3

County, Idaho, according to the plat filed in Book 4 of Plats, Page 43, records of said County,
and running thence
North 205 feet along the East boundary of said Lot 9; thence
North 63°0' West 108 feet and
North 81 °0' West 215. 7 feet to the intersection of the West boundary line of said Lot 9; thence
South 287. 7 feet along said West line to the Southwest comer of said Lot 9; thence
East 309.2 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
R. Vol. 1, p. 8.
Hoke had the Subject Property listed for sale. R. Vol. 1, p. 112. Ne Yada made an offer to
purchase the Subject Property. R. Vol. 1, p. 112. Closing took place on November 7, 2014. R.
Vol. 1, p. 112. The transaction was structured as a lease of the property with an option to
purchase. A Lease Agreement, Option to Purchase, Bills of Sale and Escrow Instructions were
executed. R. Vol. 1, p. 54-65, 69-74, 112, 113, 115-137.
The Lease Agreement listed Kenneth W. Hoke and Marian G. Hoke as the "Lessor".
Hoke signed in her individual capacity. The address of the Subject Property was listed. Attached
to the Lease was a listing of the various mobile homes. R. Vol. 1, p. 58-60, 119-121. The legal
description was listed only as "07-03-2W NW Hokes TRLR [number of trailer] R255440000". R.
Vol. 1, p. 54-60, 119-121.
The Option to Purchase listed Kenneth W. Hoke & Marian G. Hoke as "seller". Hoke
signed in her individual capacity. The Option to Purchase did not include the Subject Property
address. It referenced a legal description to be attached as Exhibit "A". The attached Exhibit A
listed the legal description as follows: "07-3N-2W PORTNER SUB TX 2 IN LT 9, TX 05292 &
05293 IN BLK 9". R. Vol. 1, p. 61-65, 122-126.
4

Hoke received a total sum of $22.00 as part of the transaction. R. Vol. 1, p. 113, 138. She
to Ne Yada the sum of $1,610.00 for the pro rata rents from the park tenants for the month of
November, 2014. R, p. 68, 113,
Immediately after closing, Hoke became concerned about the transaction. After
consulting with counsel, a letter dated December 1, 2014 was sent to NeYada and Idaho Escrow
LLC. The letter notified them that Hoke considered the transaction void. R. Vol. 1, p. 139.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL/ ATTORl~EY FEES ON APPEAL
SHOULD HOKE BE A WARDED ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL?
Basis of the Claim for Attorney Fees
The basis of the claim for attorney fees and costs is under Idaho Appellate Rule 40 and
41, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) and 54(d)(l), Idaho Code §12-120(1), (3), Idaho Code
§12-121 and the terms of the Lease Agreement. Hoke was the prevailing party below as she
received a Summary Judgment in her favor for the relief she sought in the Complaint.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) provides that the court may award attorney fees to
the prevailing party when provided by statute or contract. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)
allows costs to the prevailing party as a matter of right. Discretionary costs may also be awarded.
Idaho Code §12-120(1) provides that in any action where the amount plead is $35,000 or
less, there shall be allowed to the prevailing party a reasonable amount to be fixed by the Court
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as attorney fees. Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides that in any civil action to recover on an open
account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty or contract relating to the
purchase or sale of goods and in any commercial transaction, the prevailing party shall be
allowed a reasonable attorneys' fee. The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.
Idaho Code §12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) allow in a civil action
the award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party where the other party acted
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.
The Lease Agreement provides that "In the event of Lessor or Lessee breach any of the
terms of this Lease whereby the party not in default employs an attorney to protect or enforce its
rights hereunder and prevails, then the defaulting party agrees to pay the other party reasonable
attorneys' fees so incurred by such party." R. Vol. 1, p. 56, 117.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE LEASE
AGREEMENT AND OPTION TO PURCHASE ARE UNENFORCEA BLE UNDER THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The Lease Agreement and Option to Purchase are both void.

The Idaho statute of frauds requires that any conveyance, grant or assignment of an
interest in real property be in writing. The District Court correctly found that the Lease
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Agreement and Option to Purchase were conveyances of interests in real property that were
insufficient under the statute of frauds.
Idaho Code §9-503 provides that no estate or interest in real property, other than for
leases for a term not exceeding one (1) year, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or
declared other an by an instrument in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same.
Idaho Code §9-505 provides the following:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or
by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
wTiting or secondary evidence of its contents: ( 1) An agreement that by its terms is
not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. ... (4) An agreement
for the leasing, for a longer period than one (1) year, for the sale, of real property,
or of an interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party
sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in writing,
subscribed by the party sought to be charged.
In the case of Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009), the Court addressed
the issue of whether a physical address in a real estate contract sufficiently describes the property
for purposes of the statute of frauds. In that case, Frasure entered into a real estate contract to sell
certain real property. The contract listed the address of the property. The contract included a space
for a legal description but it was left blank. After a delay in the closing, Frasure refused to proceed
with the agreement.
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The Court considered whether a physical address in a real estate contract sufficiently
described the property for the purposes of the statute of frauds. The Court concluded that the
property description consisting solely of a physical address does not satisfy the statute of frauds.

Ray, 146 Idaho at 628,200 P.3d at 1177. The physical address gives no indication of the quantity,
identity or boundaries of the real property. Ray, 146 Idaho at 628 and 630,200 P.3d at 1177 and
1179.
The Court noted that the statute of frauds renders an agreement for the sale of real property
invalid unless the agreement is in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. The
Court went on to state that "Agreements for sale of real property that fail to comply with the
statute of frauds are unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for
specific performance." Ray, 146 Idaho at 628, 200 P .3d at 1177 (quoting Hoffman v. SV Col, Inc.,
102 Idaho 187,190,628 P.2d 218,221 (1981)).

Ray, supra, considered two early Idaho decisions as to the validity of a contract for the sale
of real property. In the case of Kurdy v. Rogers, 10 Idaho 416,423, 79 P. 195, 196 (1904), the
court found that a contract for the sale of real property must speak for itself and that a court may
not admit parol evidence to supply any of the terms of the contract, including the description of
the property. The description of the land in that case did not indicate the county or state in which
the land was located. Id. The Court held that parol evidence is not admissible to supply any of the
terms of the contract. Id. InAllen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909), the contract did
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not contain a complete description of the real property or refer to any external record containing a
sufficient description. The contract did not include the city, county or state in which the property
was located. Id
In the case of Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P. 3d 1031 (2003) the Court
addressed the reference in a purchase and sale agreement to an unidentified attached map and
three tax notices. The Court held that the description of real property must adequately describe the
property so that it is possible for someone to identify exactly what property the seller is conveying
to the buyer. The property descriptions in the tax notices were incomplete and did not allow
someone to identify exactly what property the seller was conveying to the buyer. Garner, 139
Idaho at 435, 80 P.3d at 1036. In this case, although there is a general reference to what may be a
tax parcel number, this reference is not enough to provide for a description of the Subject Property
to identify exactly what property is involved. Listing only an address, or referencing a tax notice,
is not sufficient to identify exactly what property was involved as they do not describe the
quantity, identity or boundaries of the property.
Subsequent to Ray, supra, the Idaho Federal District Court addressed the issue as to
whether a right of first refusal was subject to the statute of frauds. In Magnolia Enters., LLC v.
Schons, 2099 WL 1658022 *4 (D. Idaho 2009), the parties executed three writings, a Real Estate

Purchase and Sale Agreement, an Addendum, and an agreement concerning the property sale. The
Addendum and the agreement contained right of first refusal language. Neither document
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contained a legal description of the real property. The court concluded that options were similar to
a right of first refusal. 2009 WL 2658022*2. The cases of Lawyer v. Post et al., 109 F. 512,514
(9th Cir. 1901) and Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180,438 P.2d 925, 926-927 (Idaho 1968) were
cited for the position that options must comply with the statute of frauds. 2009 WL 1658022*3.
The court held that the standards set forth in Ray v. Frasure, supra, apply with equal force to an
outright conveyance of property and to the conveyance of a limited property interest such as a
right of first refusal.
In this matter, the Lease and Option to Purchase both lacked adequate legal descriptions.
The Lease Agreement describes the property as "that certain mobile home park formerly known as
Hoke Mobile Home Park, consisting of 14 mobile home lots, and 13 mobile homes, situated on
1.96 acres ofland located at 16867 Portner Rd. In Nampa, Idaho." R. Vol. 1, p. 115. Attached to
the lease is a listing of the mobile homes. The descriptions were listed only as "07-03-2W NW
Hokes TRLR [number of trailer] R2554400000." R. Vol. 1, p. 119-121. The Option to Purchase
lists the real property as:
Legal Description to be attached as Exhibit "A"
That certain mobile home park known as Hoke Mobile Horne Park, consisting of
14 mobile home lots, and 13 mobile homes, as more fully described in Exhibit
"A" attached hereto.
R, p. 122.
The attached Exhibit "A" lists the legal description as "07-3N-2W PORTNER SUB TX IN LT9,
TX 05292 & 05293 IN BLK 9."
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The Option to Purchase did not include any reference to the city, county or state of the
property in question. There was no indication of the quantity, identity or boundaries of the real
property. It is impossible to identify exactly what property is involved. The legal description
attached to the Option appears to be the legal description as listed on the county real property
records. R. Vol. 1, p. 149. Such a reference was found to be inadequate in Garner, supra. This is
not sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds as it is at best only a partial legal description without
city, county or state. The reference to the "Hoke Mobile Home Park" does not provide an
identifiable location for the property. This "Park" is not platted or identified on any recording in
the Canyon County property records. This is merely a general reference to the property owned by
Hoke and operated as a mobile home park.
The documents must speak for themselves. "It is not a question as to what the contract
was intended to be, but, rather, was it consummated by being reduced to writing as prescribed by
the statute of frauds." Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 145, 100 P. 1052, 1055 (1909).
Although the documents are not of themselves purchase agreements, as was addressed in
Ray, the transaction contemplated in this case was a conveyance of an interest in real property to
Ne Y ada. As noted in Magnolia, supra, options must comply with the statute of frauds. Magnolia,
2009 WL 1658022. The court in that case invalidated all three agreements entered into between
the parties since two of the documents contained a right of first refusal that the court found must
contain a proper legal description under the statue of frauds. In this case, the transaction involved
both a lease and an option to purchase. The documents were executed in one transaction and
11

were expected by the parties to be one transaction. The documents are not severable from the
other. Indeed, the Lease Agreements states "This Lease Agreement is subject to and contingent
upon the Lessor entering into a written agreement with Ne Yada Inc., giving them the right to
purchasethesubjectprope rty."R. Vol.1,p.117.
The option did not contain a proper legal description. It contained only a partial vague
description without any reference to an address, city, county or state of the property. None of the
documents executed by the parties on the same date include enough information to form or refer
to a document with a proper legal description.

The Lease Agreement is not enforceable on its own.
NeYada asserts that the Lease Agreement and Option to Purchase are two separate
documents whereby the Lease Agreement can be enforced even without enforcement of the
Option to Purchase. This argument ignores the fact that the two documents were entered into as a
single transaction at the same time. Neither document was intended to stand on its own without
the other. The Lease Agreement specifically states that its is contingent upon the Option to
Purchase. R. Vol. 1, p. 117. The Option to Purchase provides for a credit against the purchase
price for lease payments made under the separate "Land Lease". R. Vol. 1, p. 122.
There is no question that the two documents, the Lease Agreement and the Option to
Purchase, were to comprise a single transaction. The documents cannot by their terms be severed
from each other. The Lease Agreement was specifically made subject to and contingent upon the
Option to Purchase. Therefore, since the Option to Purchase is invalid under the statute of frauds,
12

the Lease Agreement is invalid as well.
\\,'here the parties assent to a group of promises as a single whole, the group of promises
constitute a single contract. Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124,126,578 P.2d 240,243 (1978).
This Court should uphold the decision of the lower court and look at all the documents as a
whole to conclude that the property was not properly described to satisfy the statute of frauds.
The Lease Agreement cannot stand on its own. The entire transaction was properly set aside by
the District Court.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO APPLY THE
DOCTRINE OF PARTIAL PERFORMANCE
NeYada asserts that part performance takes the matter outside the statute of frauds. Idaho
Code §9-504 states that the statute of frauds must not be construed to abridge the power of any
court to compel specific performance of any agreement in the case of part performance. See also

Simmons v. Simmons, 134 Idaho 824, 827, 11 P.3d 20, 23 (2000). Under the doctrine of part
performance, "when the parties to an agreement fail to reduce the agreement to writing, or
otherwise fail to satisfy the statute of frauds, the agreement "may nevertheless be specifically
enforced when the purchaser has partly performed the agreement." Bauchman-Kingston P 'ship,

LP v. Haroldson, 149 Idaho 87, 92,233 P. 3d 18, 23 (Idaho 2008) (citing Chapin v. Linden, 162
P.3d 772, 775 (Idaho 2007).
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Part performance may be established as an equitable ground to avoid the strictures of the
statute of frauds. Wing v. Munns, 123 Idaho 493,499,849 P.2d 954, 961. The court stated:
Another underlying principle, applicable where the contract does not comply with
the statute of frauds, is that equity will not enforce it except in cases where a
refusal to do so would be inequitable. Conversely, where a party has so
performed, or changed his position in reliance on the contract, that to allow the
other party to interpose the statute of frauds as a defense, would perpetrate a fraud
on the performing party, and the legal remedy is inadequate, equity will decree
specific performance.
In this case, NeYada's part performance constitutes several payments into an escrow
account. These payments were made after being notified by counsel for Hoke that the agreements
are unenforceable. R. Vol. 1, p. 139. Such payments do not constitute fully or even a substantial
portion of the payments to be made under the agreements. NeYada made a few payments under a
lease to last for five (5) years. What constitutes part performance depends upon the particular
facts of each case and the sufficiency of the particular acts is a matter of law to be determined by
the court. Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 827, 11 P.3d 20, 23 (2000). Payments made by
NeYada and actions taken by it after being notified of the defects in the documents does not
constitute part performance sufficient for an equitable remedy of taking the matter outside the
statute of frauds.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING ATTORJ.~EY FEES TO HOKE
Hoke filed her Memorandum and Affidavit of Costs and Attorney Fees with the Court on
April 23, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 254. Thereafter, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and
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Order for Costs and Attorney Fees and for Turnover of Property. R. Vol. 1, p. 292. The lower
court found that Hoke was the prevailing party in the action under LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). R. Vol.

1, p. 294. The Court cited Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldson, 149 Idaho 87, 94,

23 3 P .3d 18, 25 (2008) for the position that even when a contract is found unenforceable, the
prevailing party may still recover attorney fees pursuant to the underlying agreement. R. Vol. 1,
p. 295.
This court should uphold the District Court's award of attorney fees to Hoke. She should
be granted attorney fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the ruling of the lower court that Hoke is entitled to Summary
Judgment in her favor. The Lease Agreement and Option to Purchase are void under the statute
of frauds. This court should further uphold the award of attorney fees by the lower court. Hoke
should also receive attorney fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this--"_ day of February, 2016.

MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC

Laura E. Burri

15

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Respondent's Brief, was mailed by U.S.
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Magnolia Enterprises, LLC v. Schons, Not Reported in

2009 WL 1658022
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,
D. Idaho.
MAGNOLIA ENTERPRISES, LLC, Plaintiff,
v.
Roy N. SCHONS, the Real Estate Connection,
David R. Deichman, Arlene A Deichman, and the

INTRODUCTION
*1 The Court has before it Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10). The Court heard
arguments of counsel on April 7, 2009. As explained
below, after considering the briefs and arguments of counsel,
the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

Deichman Family Revocable Trust, Defendants.
No. CV-08-376-N-BLW.

I
June

11,

2009.

West KeySurnrnary

1

Federal Civil Procedure
Land and land use, cases involving in
general

A genuine issue of material fact existed as to the
precise legal description of the seller's retained
property. The purchaser of real property had a
right of first refusal to purchase seller's retained
property, which the seller allegedly sold without
first offering it to the purchaser. Therefore,
summary judgment was precluded in a breach of
contract claim.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
B. LYNN WINMTLL, Chief Judge.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from a real estate transaction. Plaintiff
Magnolia Enterprises, LLC ("Plaintiff') agreed to purchase
real property from Defendants. Three writings, signed by
the parties to this action, concern the purchase and sale of
Defendants' property to Plaintiff. First, the parties signed a
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement ("REPSA") on
March 26, 2004. An addendum to the Real Estate Purchase
and Sale Agreement ("Addendum") was signed by the parties
on that same day. Then, on April 16, 2004, the parties
signed another agreement ("Agreement") concerning the
property sale. The REPSA references the Addendum and the
Agreement references both the REPSA and the Addendum.
Both the Addendum and the Agreement contain right of first
refusal language. Both writings state:
10. Right of First Refusal: The
Purchaser shall have a First Right
of Refusal to purchase Seller's
retained property. Seller agrees to give
Purchaser twenty (20) days written
notice and a copy of all written
offers Seller receives on their retained
property. Purchaser must respond in
writing and match the third party's
offer within the twenty (20) days or the
Seller is free to sell to the third party
that wrote the offer.
Neither document contains a definition of the "Seller's
retained property." Nor do they contain a legal description
of the retained property. However, pursuant to the terms
of the Agreement, Defendants were to complete a lot-line
adjustment after the sale. The lot-line adjustment required a
survey and a second amended survey, which was completed at
some point after all agreements had been signed. The survey

described two parcels as "Parcel A" and "Parcel B." After
the lot-line adjustment was completed, a warranty deed was
executed conveying the "Parcel B" real property to Plaintiff.
Subsequently, Defendants sold some of their real property,
"Parcel A," without giving Plaintiff notice. Plaintiff claims
the property sold was the "Seller's retained property"
referenced in the right of first refusal in the Addendum and
Agreement. Plaintiff then filed the complaint in this case in
September of 2008, claiming breach of contract and seeking
damages.

ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment Motions
One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is
to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims .... "
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It is "not a disfavored
procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ]
by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can]
be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources." Id at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
fact." Anderson v. Liberty lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 ( 1986).

*2 The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, id at 255, and the Court must
not make credibility findings. Id. On the other hand, the
Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from
circumstantial evidence. Mclaughlin v. Liu. 849 F.2d 1205,
1208 (9th Cir.1988).

256-57. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings
and show "by her affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine issue of
material fact exists. Celotex. 477 U.S. at 324.

II. Discussion
The main disagreement between Plaintiff and Defendants
on this motion is whether a sufficient description of the
property subject to the right of first refusal is contained in
the Agreement and Addendum. Plaintiff contends a right of
first refusal is not an interest in real property subject to the
statute of frauds, so that extrinsic evidence may be used to
help define what the parties meant in using the term "Seller's
retained property." Plaintiff further argues that, even if a right
of first refusal is an interest in real property and subject to
the statute of frauds, the standard for sufficiency of a property
description is not as burdensome for a limited interest in
real property as it is for the outright sale of real property.
Defendants argue the statute of frauds applies with full force
to a right of first refusal because it is an interest in real
property, and that the term "Seller's retained property" is
an insufficient description to satisfy the strict standard for
describing property imposed by the statute of frauds. As the
standard for sufficiency of the description depends, in part,
on whether a right of first refusal is subject to the statute of
frauds, the Court addresses this issue first.

A. A Right of First Refusal is an Interest in Real
Property and is Subject to the Statute of Frauds
The Idaho appellate courts have not directly addressed the
question of whether a right of first refusal is an interest in
real property. However, the Idaho case law suggests that, if
presented with that precise question, the Idaho courts would
conclude that it is. One strong indicator of such a result is the
manner in which the federal and state courts have dealt with
options to purchase real property under Idaho law.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux
v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2001) (en bane).
To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce
any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition
excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman
Cato Johnson. 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000).

Options are similar to a right of first refusal; indeed, rights
of first refusal are a type of option. Both restrict whether a
landowner can sell his land to someone other than the holder
of the option or right of first refusal. Therefore, whether
options are considered an interest in real property by Idaho
courts is instructive to whether Idaho courts would consider
a right of first refusal an interest in real property.

This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce
evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. ld. at

*3 The Ninth Circuit, reviewing an older version ofldaho's
statute of frauds, which was identical in all material respects
to the current version, determined that oral agreements to

create an option or extend an existing written option were
invalid because options had to comply with the writing
requirement of the statute of frauds. Lawyer v. Post et al., 109
F. 512. 514 (9th Cir.l901 ). The Idaho Supreme Court, citing
to Post, has more recently stated that options must comply
with the statute of frauds. Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180,
438 P.2d 925, 926-27 (Idaho 1968). Because a right of first
refusal is so similar in nature to an option, the Court concludes
that a right of first refusal is an interest in real property subject
to the statute of frauds.

1

B. The Right of First Refusal Does Not Contain an
Adequate Legal Description and the Plaintiff is therefore
not entitled to Summary Judgment
Turning then to the question of whether the right of first
refusal in the parties' Addendum and Agreement complied
with Idaho's statute of frauds, the Court notes that one of
the requirements of the statute of frauds, other than that the
agreement must be in writing, is that "the writing must also
contain a description of the property, either in terms or by
reference, so that the property can be identified without resort
to parol evidence." Ray v. Frasure, 146 [daho 625,200 P.3d
1174, 1177 (Idaho 2009). This standard is as strict as it
appears. The Idaho courts have held that it is not satisfied by a
lot and block number if a reference to the political subdivision
is omitted,.-ll!en v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909),
by reference to a tax notice, Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho
430, 80 P.3d I031, I036 (Idaho 2003 ), by reference to a
survey yet to be conducted of land excluded from the sale,
White v. Rehn. l 03 Idaho I, 644 P.2d 323, 325 ( 1982), or by
reference to a street address. Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625,
200 P.3d 1174, 1177 (Idaho 2009). But see In re: ;v!iller v.
Provident Bank, 260 B.R. 158 (Bankr.D.ldaho 200 I).

Plaintiff contends that Idaho would not impose the same rigid
requirement of a sufficient property description for limited
interests in real property, such as a right of first refusal, as
it does for outright sale of real property. However, Plaintiff
overstates the holding of the cases upon which it relies.
For example, Plaintiff cites an Idaho Supreme Court case
for the proposition that a simple sketch of road on a plat
is enough of a description. Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho
529, 585 P.2d 608 (Idaho 1978). However, in Monaco, the
court did not address the issue of sufficiency of description.
Rather, the focus of the decision was on an estoppel argument
based on a claim that the defendant had made a dedication
of the land in question which was analogous to a public
road dedication. In that context, the sketch was discussed as

providing further evidence of this analogy. Id. Wben read in
context, the interpretation that Plaintiff gives to the case is
unsupported by its language or reasoning.
*4 Another example is Garmo v. Clanton, 97 ldaho 696, 551
P.2d 1332 (Idaho 1976), in which the Idaho Supreme Court
focuses on the sufficiency of a price description. The right of
first refusal in that case described the subject property as "a
narrow strip of land," and the court did indicate that a right
of first refusal was created. However, there was no discussion
about the adequacy of the description, and it appeared that
the parties' only concern on appeal was whether the language
discussing price was adequate. The case is therefore unhelpful
to the decision in this case.

The same conclusion can be drawn from the other Idaho
cases cited by the plaintiff. They are taken out of context, or
otherwise do not support the plaintiffs contention that a right
of first refusal is subject to a different standard for a property
description than the outright sale of real property.
Plaintiff goes on to cite Missouri and Montana cases for
the proposition that rights of first refusal should be treated
differently from the outright sale of real property because
the terms of a right of first refusal must be general since it
is a right that will not come to fruition until a later date in
the future. While this may be true of the price term, which
the seller will not know until an offer is made, it is not true
of the property description. The policy arguments in favor
of the statute of frauds for an outright conveyance of real
property apply with equal force to a right of first refusal.
In both instances, the statute will avoid litigation, prevent
clouds on the title of real property, and prevent unnecessary
disputes as the precise boundaries of the property to be
conveyed. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the standard
for a sufficient property description reflected in decisions
discussing the sale of property in Idaho should be applied to
rights of first refusal. 2
For a property description to be sufficient, the quantity,
identity, or boundaries must be determinable from the face of
the contract or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which the
contract specifically refers. Lexington Heights Development,
LLC v. Crandlemire. 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526,531 (Idaho
2004). Paro! evidence may not be used to supply a description.
Id. The statute of frauds may be satisfied by a legal description
contained in a document extrinsic to the contract, but the
contract must contain a clear and unambiguous reference to

that extrinsic document. Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200
P.3d 1174, 1179 (Idaho 2009).
The decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court indicate that this
requirement is exacting. For example, in Ray v. Frasure,
the seller and buyer used only the physical address of a
residence to describe the real property to be sold and left
the spot for a legal description blank. Id at 1175. The court
held that a physical address alone was not a sufficient legal
description. Significantly, the court declined to consider the
legal description contained in the deed previously conveying
the residence with the exact same physical address to the
seller because the contract in question did not contain a
specific reference the deed. Id. at 1179. Similarly, in a case
where a description, in the form of a map with writing, was
physically attached to an addendum that was referenced in
the contract, but the addendum indicated it was only one
page and did not itself reference the attached map, the Idaho
Supreme Court could not conclude the map became part of the
contract. Bauchman-Kingston Partnership LP v. Haroldsen,
No. 34551, 2008 WL 5133788, at *4 (Idaho). Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, the court's decision in Lexington
Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276,
92 P.3d 526, 531 (Idaho 2004), makes clear that a reference
to a survey to be performed after the execution of the contract
is insufficient. In Lexington Heights, the parties entered into
a written contract that stated the legal description would
be prepared as a result of an "ALTA survey." Id After
the ALTA survey was completed, the parties entered into a
superceding contract which contained the same reference to
a legal description which "will be" prepared as a result of an
"ALTA survey" to be obtained by the seller. Id. The court

determined this was an insufficient legal description because
the previous ALT A survey could not be used as it was already
in existence and the contract referred to a survey that was to
be done subsequent to the contract. Id at 532.
*5 In this case, the parties' agreements do not contain a
sufficient legal description. The property subject to the right
of first refusal is only described as the "Seller's retained
property," and no legal description is provided. While the
parties' agreements provided for a survey of the conveyed
property to be conducted after the contracts had been signed,
there is no explicit provision as to how the conveyed property
was to be distinguished from the retained property. As
such, the agreements did not make a clear and unambiguous
reference to an extrinsic document containing a precise legal
description of the "Seller's retained property." Indeed, the
survey was not in existence at the time the contracts were
executed, and therefore could not provide the required legal
description by reference. For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment must be denied.

CONCLUSION

NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No.
10) shall be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

All Citations

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2009 WL 1658022

Footnotes

1

2

The Court also finds support from other jurisdictions for its conclusion that a right of first refusal is subject to the statute
of fi'auds .. The Idaho statute of frauds requires that any conveyance, grant, or assignment of an interest in real property
be 1n writing. Idaho Code §§ 9-503, 9-505. At least one other jurisdiction with similar statutory language treats a right
of first refusal as a property interest subject to the statute of frauds. E.g., Bravo Farms, L.L.C. v. Battin, No. 26550-1111, 2008 WL 3867162, at *2-3 (Wash.App. Div. 3).
~!though both parties cite to other states' law for further discussion of how the standard for a property description operates
in a land sale contract, the Court declines to use such precedent as there is sufficient and binding Idaho law on point.
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